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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
DAISY HELEN KINSLEY, sometimes 
known as HELEN D. KINSLEY, 
Individually and as Executrix of the 
Estate of Otho V. Kinsley, also known 
as Otho Verne Kinsley, Deceased, 
Plaintiff & Appellant, 
v. 
LE\VIS H. LARSEN and 
DOROTHY G. LARSEN, his wife, 
Individually, and doing business as 
LARSEN ENTERPRISES and 
BELCO PETROLEUM 
CORPORATION, a corporation, 
Defendants & Respondents. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
Case No. 
10339 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is an action to recover monies wrongfully paid 
by defendant Belco Petroleum Corporation to defendant 
Lewis H. Larsen as purported agent of plaintiff, and 
misappropriated by him, in connection with the pur-
chase of oil and gas interests by defendC\Ilt Belco Petro-
leum Corporation. 
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DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Prior to trial, on motion of defendant Belco Pe-
troleum Corporation, Summary Judgment was granted 
against plaintiff in favor of Belco Petroleum Corporation 
dismissing plaintiff's Complaint as to it ( R 72, 73). The 
issues have not been resolved as between plaintiff and 
other respondents. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks a reversal of the Summary J udg-
ment dismissing plaintiff's Complaint as to respondent 
Belco Petroleum Corporation, and judgment in her favor 
as a matter of law. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Otho V. Kinsley, a resident of Tucson, Arizona, prior 
to his death on March 28, 1962, was the owner of an 
undivided one-half interest in certain royalties and work-
ing interests under two State of Utah oil and gas leases 
on lands in San Juan County, Utah (R 2, 29, 60). The 
defendants Lewis H. Larsen and Dorothy G. Larsen, his 
wife, were owners of the other undivided one-half inter-
est (R 3, 13, 29). This action is brought by plaintiff as 
the widow and executrix of the estate of Otho V. Kinsley 
to recover part of the proceeds from the sale of the 
parties' interests totalling $384,000.00 paid by the de-
fendant Belco Petroleum Corporation to defendant Lewis 
H. Larsen, as agent, without authority on March 22, 1962, 
and deposited to his account under the name of Larsen 
Enterprises (R 2, 3, 11-14, 29). Under date of March 31, 
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1962, Larsen remitted $92,000.00 to Kinsley in Tucson, 
and withheld the sum of $100,000.00 due Kinsley (R 3, 
7, 29). On August 6, 1963, subsequent to the filing of 
the suit and attachment, the sum of $22,400.11 was paid 
to plaintiff by Larsen but the balance of the $100,000.00 
was never turned over to decedent or plaintiff ( R 4a, 
29) . The defendant Lewis H. Larsen concedes that he 
owes plaintiff the sum of $77,599.89, plus interest, but 
the defendant, Dorothy G. Larsen, denies that she is a 
partner in Larsen Enterprises, or that she is liable ( R 4a, 
29). 
Pursuant to a motion under Rule 56, U.R.C.P., 
Summary Judgment dismissing plaintiff's complaint 
against Belco Petroleum Corporation was entered on 
March 3, 1965, after the court concluded that the fol-
lowing telegram sent by Otho V. Kinsley, the deceased, 
to Lewis H. Larsen on February 12, 1962, constituted 
an appointment of Larsen as the agent of Kinsley to sell 
the mineral interests and to receive payment from Belco 
Petroleum Corporation (R 72, 73) : 
Pursuant to our telephone call this evening, 
this will be your authority to dispose of our in-
terest at not less than $160,000.00 or any amount 
greater for which you dispose of your interest. 
Otho V. Kinsley 
On or about March 16, 1962, the defendant, Belco 
Petroleum Corporation, without notice to, or prior ap-
proval of deceased or plaintiff, entered into an agree-
ment with the defendant Lewis H. Larsen under the 
terms of which Belco agreed to pay direct to Larsen, as 
agent, the total sum of $384,000.00 in payment of the 
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respective interests of the Kinsleys and the Larsens in 
and to the oil and gas leases in question (Ex. 10, Depo-
sition of Lewis H. Larsen, taken at the instance of 
defendant Belco). No notice was given to Kinsleys by 
Belco Petroleum Corporation, or its attorneys, that such 
agreement was entered into, or of the amount agreed 
upon for the sale of said interests or of the fact that 
Belco intended to make payment to Lewis H. Larsen, as 
agent ( R 66) , although Belco Petroleum Corporation 
and its attorney repeatedly sent many legal documents 
to Otho V. Kinsley for execution and return in con-
nection with sale after the agreement and prior to 
payment to Larsen ( R 50, 65, 66). Kinsleys returned 
the various documents to Larsen, who then delivered 
them to Belco ( R 50) . No formal power of attorney 
authorizing the defendants Lewis H. Larsen or Dorothy 
G. Larsen, his wife, or Larsen Enterprises to act as 
agent in dealing with the property or for receipt of the 
money for the plaintiff or deceased was ever delivered 
or recorded in the office of the County Recorder of 
San Juan County, Utah, pursuant to the provisions of 
Section 57-1-8, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 (R 4a, 29). 
Previously, on about November 2, 1960, defendant 
Lewis H. Larsen had advised Belco Petroleum Corpora-
tion (hereinafter referred to as Belco) to make all pay-
ments for moneys due Kinsleys under the leases to them 
in Tucson, Arizona (R 5, 30). Under date of March 7, 
1961, Belco sent certain clarification documents to the 
deceased Otho V. Kinsley, together with an oil division 
order which was signed and returned to defendant Belco 
Petroleum Corporation requiring payment for oil runs to 
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be made to the Kinsleys, and the Kinsleys in fact periodi-
cally received the proceeds of their share of the royalty 
and other payments under the leases direct from Belco 
at all times prior to March 26, 1962 (R 65, 66, 67a). 
At no time prior to the payment by Belco Petroleum 
Corporation to Lewis H. Larsen, as agent, did Belco or 
L. E. Eggertsen, as its attorney, or Lewis H. Larsen, or 
anyone, advise the plaintiff or the deceased that the 
proceeds of the sale of the oil interests were to be paid 
to Lewis H. Larsen, as agent ( R 65, 66). Nor did Belco 
advise plaintiff or the deceased that it was entering into 
an agreement with Lewis H. Larsen, under the terms of 
which Larsen was to be paid the moneys due the Kinsleys 
for their interests in and to the oil leases in question ( R 
66). Neither plaintiff, nor the deceased, were parties to 
the purported agreement of March 16, 1962, referred 
to in the affidavit of L. E. Eggertsen, attorney for Belco 
(Ex. 10, Deposition of Lewis H. Larsen) . 
The defendant Larsen admits payment by Belco 
to him on March 22, 1962 (R 2, 29) but Larsen, in a 
letter dated March 26, 1962, to the deceased Otho V. 
Kinsley said: "It appears that the deal will be closed 
for the full amount of $192,000.00." (R 6) Lewis H. 
Larsen, without advising the decedent Kinsley of the 
fact that the money already had been pai~ by Belco 
direct to him, he (Larsen) requested a loan from Kinsley 
of $100,000.00 for the purpose of buying 1,000 head 
of cattle ( R 6) . Otho Kinsley died in Tucson, Arizona 
on -
11
28, 1962, two days after the above letter was 
dated at Salt Lake City by defendant Lewis H. Larsen 
( R 6, 60) . The bank stamps on the reverse side of the 
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drafts from Belco show without question that the same 
were deposited by defendant Lewis H. Larsen, to his 
account at Walker Bank & Trust Company on or prior 
to the 26th of March, 1962 (R 56-57a). 
Under the date of March 31, 1962, at least three 
davs after the death of Otho V. Kinsley, Lewis Larsen 
fo~arded from Salt Lake City a letter addressed to 
Kinsley, enclosing a check for $92,000.00 and a promis-
sory note for $100,000.00 dated April 2, 1962 (R 3, 4, 
7, 8) . The promissory note was not accepted by the 
deceased or the plaintiff ( R 4, 29), but was retained as 
evidence of the indebtedne~ ( R 63 ) . 
There is nothing in the record to indicate that 
Kinsley had any knowledge of the representations made 
by Larsen to Belco, if any, of the scope of his authority 
or agency. 
The agreement referred to in the counter-affidavit 
of plaintiff between Larsen and Belco dated March 12, 
1962 is the same agreement as that referred to in the 
affidavit of L. E. Eggertsen between Larsen and Belco 
as having been dated March 16, 1962 ( R 50, 66). This 
latter date is the correct date. 
Upon plaintiff's objection to the competency of the 
defendant Lewis H. Larsen as a witness under Section 
78-24-2(3), U.C.A. 1953, the court on the hearing of 
the Motion for Summary Judgment refused to consider 
testimony in his deposition pertaining to statements of 
the deceased Otho V. Kinsley or transactions with the 
decedent. The deposition was taken at the instance of 
the defendant Belco and formal objections were made 
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prior to the hearing ( R 68) . Plaintiff made a motion 
to strike the affidavit of Lawrence Ruben in support of 
the Motion for Summary Judgment ( R 70, 71). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT 1 
THE DEFENDANT LEWIS H. LARSEN WAS 
NOT, AS A MATTER OF LAW, AUTHORIZED TO 
RECEIVE PAYMENT OF THE SALES PRICE OF 
THE PROPERTY, AS AGENT, AND SUCH DID 
NOT CONSTITUTE PAYMENT TO PRINCIPAL. 
The primary issue in this case is whether the tele-
gram from decedent Otho V. Kinsley dated February 
12, 1962, to the defendant Lewis H. Larsen in light 
of the other evidence and the inferences to be drawn 
therefrom at the time of the hearing on the Motion 
for Summary Judgment, constituted sufficient authority, 
as a matter of law, for Belco Petroleum Corporation to 
pay the purchase price for Kinsley's property to the 
defendant Lewis H. Larsen as agent. 
The other facts and propositions established by the 
record are: 
1. No proof has been adduced that an express agen-
cy existed authorizing Larsen to receive payment as 
agent. 
2. That the deceased Otho V. Knisley was a record 
owner along with Larsen of an undivided one-half in-
terest in the royalty and working interests in the oil and 
gas leases involved ( R 29) . 
1 
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3. That Belco had made uninterrupted royalty and 
other payments under the exact leases involved in this 
sale direct to the deceased Otho V. Kinsley in Tucson, 
Arizona prior to the sale ( R 66) . 
4. That neither Belco nor its attorneys advised 
plaintiff or the deceased that the purchase price in 
question was to be paid to Lewis H. Larsen as agent ( R 
66), even though Belco and its attorney corresponded 
with the Kinsleys and repeatedly forwarded documents 
of conveyance and assignments to them to be executed 
personally in connection with the transaction ( R 65, 50). 
5. That the plaintiff or deceased had no knowl-
edge that Belco had entered into the agreement of March 
16, 1962, with the defendant Lewis H. Larsen, under 
the terms of which payment was to be made direct to 
Larsen ( R 66) . 
6. That defendant Lewis H. Larsen was admittedly 
not a general agent with full powers as evidenced by 
the requirement that deceased and plaintiff sign and 
execute all documents of conveyances in favor of Belco, 
arid Kinsleys then returned the executed documents to 
Lewis H. Larsen (R 50). 
7. That Lewis H. Larsen advised Belco in 1960 
that payments in connection with the oil and gas leases 
due the Kinsleys should be sent directly to him in Tucson, 
Arizona ( R 5) in accordance with the usual and cus-
tomary practice of payments to a record owner of an 
oil interest ( R 30) . 
8. That on March 7, 1961, approximately one year 
before the sale, Belco requested a division order to be 
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signed in connection with one of the leases, which order 
required payments to be made by Belco direct to the 
deceased Kinsley ( R 65 ) . 
9. That no formal and complete power of attorney 
was executed and delivered by Kinsley to Larsen, or 
recorded (R 4a, 30). 
10. That defendant Lewis H. Larsen had been paid 
by Belco and deposited the checks from Belco to his 
account at the time he wrote Kinsley requesting a loan 
and has never turned over the balance of $100,000.00 to 
plaintiff (R 2, 6, 29, 56, 57a). 
There existed under these circumstances at most a 
limited agency authorizing Larsen to negotiate for a sale 
of the mineral interests in question pursuant to the tenns 
of the telegram of February 16, 1962. It is, of course, a 
general rule that any doubt as to the authority of an 
agent to do a particular act is to be resolved against the 
agent and those dealing with him. Further, any such 
power and the authority granted must be strictly con-
strued and not extended by construction. ( 2 C.].S. Agen-
cy, Sec. 114(bb) page 1328). 
Otho V. Kinsley and Lewis H. Larsen were co-
tenants under the oil and gas leases in question. It is 
well settled in Utah that one co-tenant can make no 
agreement affecting the interest of another in a property 
jointly owned and that such co-tenants are not agents 
or partners by virtue of their joint interests. Garner v. 
Anderson, ( 1926) 67 Utah 553 at page 563, 248 P. 496. 
It has been held that such co-ownership is the anti-
thesis of principal and agent relationships becuause the 
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parties are equal in status and ownership. Parker v. Mc-
Cartney (1959) 216 Ore. 283, 388 P. 2d 371. 
Belco was not compelled to deal with Larsen. As a 
matter of fact, it dealt jointly with Larsen and Kinsley 
but in so choosing to deal with and pay Larsen as an 
agent, it must take the risk and deal with such an agent 
at its peril. Here the loss to plaintiff and decedent never 
would have occurred had Belco properly performed the 
duty imposed upon it by law to investigate the authority 
of the agent with whom it was dealing. The loss could 
have been averted by notice to the decedent that Belco 
intended to pay Larsen as agent, or by the simple busi-
ness-like procedure of making the checks payable jointly 
to the record owners of the interest, i.e., both Kinsley 
and Larsen. In any event, Belco assumed the risk of 
ascertaining the scope of Larsen's powers at its peril. 
The oft repeated rule is well stated in 1 Mechem on 
Agency (2d Ed.) Sec. 743, page 527: 
An assumption of authority to act as agent for 
another of itself challenges inquiry. Like a rail-
road crossing, it should be in itself a sign of danger 
and suggest the duty to 'stop look and listen.' It 
is therefore declared to be a fundamental rule, 
never to be lost sight of and not easily to be over-
estimated, that persons dealing- with an assumed 
agent, whether the assumed ag-ency be a general 
o~ special one, are bound at their peril, if they 
would hold the principal, to ascertain not only 
fact of the agency but the nature and extent of the 
authority, and in case either is controverted, the 
burden of proof is upon them to establish it. 
It is important to bear in mind that Belco did not 
rely on Larsen as a general agent and Kinsley and plain-
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tiff were personally required to execute all documents 
and conveyances in connection with the transfer ( R 50, 
65 ) . If Belco had recognized Larsen as an agent with 
other than limited powers, but clothed with the necessary 
authority to do any and all things necessary to com-
pletf' the sale and execute the documents of conveyance, 
there would have been no need for Belco and its attor-
nys to require the deceased and plaintiff to execute the 
documents of conveyance, but admittedly Larsen had 
no authority to sign the same as attorney-in-fact on 
behalf of Kinsley. 
The agency was limited and could not be enlarged 
by the representations of Larsen. There existed no ex-
press agency for Larsen to receive payment from Belco 
and any self-serving representations of Larsen whereby 
he apparently induced Belco to enter into the agreement 
with him to pay him the proceeds of the sale, could 
not enlarge the express authority contained in the tele-
gram from Kinsley. Such power is to be strictly construed, 
and any doubt as to the scope of the power to do a 
particular act is to be resolved against the agent and 
those dealing with him. This court, in accordance with 
well established general rules, in the case of Dohrmann 
Hotel Supply Co. v. Beau Brummel, Inc. (1940) 99 Utah 
188, 103 P. 2d 650, held that the defendant could not 
rely on the representation of the agent that he could 
make a settlement when the authority granted by a tele-
gram was limited, and that it was the duty of the party 
dealing with the agent to ascertain just what his author-
ity and capacity is. 
To appellant's knowledge, there are no controlling 
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Utah cases. The case of Olsen v. Tholen (1927) 111 
Utah 241, 177 P. 2d 75 involves payment to a seller's 
agent. But in that case the listing contract specifically 
authorized the agent to accept a deposit on the purchase 
price and in the event of forfeiture to the buyer, to retain, 
out of the sum forfeited an amount equal to his com-
mission, and so it is no authority in the instant case. 
The prevailing view and weight of authority is that 
authority to sell or to negotiate a sale, does not carry 
with it the right to receive from the purchaser the pur-
chase price, or any part thereof. This rule is set out in 
2 C.].S. Agency, Sec. 107, page 1276 as follows: 
A mere authority to contract for the sale of 
realty, unaccompanied by power to convey, carries 
with it no authority to collect the purchase price; 
and a mere power to deliver a conveyance and 
receive the consideration does not entitle the agent 
to receive payment thereof, particularly to his own 
use; but the language of the appointment, or the 
conduct of the principal in the light of surround-
ing facts and circumstances, may extend the 
agent's powers sufficiently for them to embrace 
authority to receive payment of the purchase 
money. 
Here the surrounding facts and circumstances, such 
as Belco's dealing with Kinsley as principal after the 
date of the telegram and the uninterrupted prior pay-
ments by Belco to the Kinsleys actually negate any ex-
tension of the scope of authority, and clearly shows that 
defendant Lewis H. Larsen was not, as a matter of law, 
authorized to receive payment of the sales price of the 
property, as agent, and such payment did not constitute 
payment to the principal. 
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The comment to the Restatement of Agency, Sec. 
53, states that unless the price and other terms have 
been completely stated by the principal, the normal in-
ference is that an agent authorized "to sell" land and 
not given a formal power of attorney, is authorized 
merely to find a purchaser. See 30 A.L.R. 2d 810, Sec. 5 
and cases cited therein in favor of the following general 
rule: 
It is generally held or stated that a real estate 
broker, under the ordinary contract of employ-
ment, giving him authority merely to produce a 
purchaser willing to contract with the seller upon 
the terms prescribed, or a broker or other agent 
whose authority is specifically limited to finding 
a purchaser for the property, or who is authorized 
simply "to sell" the property, or to negotiate its 
sale, has no implied authority, in the absence of 
additional circumstances, to receive from the pur-
chaser the purchase price, or any part thereof. 
In the case of Lynn v. Northern Federal Loan 
Association (1952) 235 Minn. 484, 51 N.W. 2d 588, 30 
A.L.R. 2d 799, it was held that the broker's authority 
to sell property is ordinarily not inclusive of the right to 
receive the purchase money therefor on behaU of his 
principal, and payment to him does not constitute pay-
ment to the principal in the absence of an expr~ or 
implied authorization. The Supreme Court of Minnesota, 
in affirming judgment for the plaintiff, held under 
circumstances similar to those present in the instant case 
that the agent was not, as a matter of law, authorized 
to receive payment, and that the question had properly 
been submitted to the jury. 
14 
POINT II 
THE COURT ERRED IN GRANTING SUM-
MARY JUDGMENT DISMISSING PLAINTIFF'S 
COMPLAINT AGAINST THE DEFENDANT BEL-
CO PETROLEUM CORPORATION AS THE EVI-
DENCE DOES NOT SUPPORT A FINDING OF 
AGENCY, EITHER EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, AS A 
:MATIER OF L.<\W, SUFFICIENT TO AUTHOR-
IZE BELCO TO PAY THE SALES PRICE OF THE 
PROPERTY TO THE DEFENDANT LARSEN AS 
AGENT, WITHOUT NOTICE OR PRIOR APPRO-
VAL OF PLAil'.'TIFF. 
A Summary Judgment is supported only by a show-
ing that there is no genuine issue as to any material 
fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment 
as a matter of law. This court has repeatedly held that 
in determining the sufficiency of such a showing, the 
burden is upon the moving party and the evidence and 
inferences therefrom must be considered in a light most 
favorable to the party against whom the judgment is 
sought. 
Apparently the trial court, in deciding the motion, 
considered only the aspects of the case most favorable 
to Belco. The basis for the court's ruling was that the 
telegram constituted sufficient authority as a matter of 
law for Larsen to sell the interests and to receive the 
purchase price (R 73). This is untenable in view of the 
holding of most courts that authority to sell does not 
carry with it the right to receive the purchase price, 
and particularly in view of all other facts and cir-
cumstances. 
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The burden was upon Belco to show that no genuine 
issues of fact existed and that it was entitled to judg-
ment as a matter of law. Further, Belco had the burden 
of ascertaining the scope and extent of the agency and 
having raised such a defense, the burden is upon it to 
prove that Larsen had authority to receive the payment 
of the proceeds. In the absence of a showing of expre. 
authority the scope of such authority is an issue of fact 
for jury determination. The party making the payment 
to an agent is required to prove by a preponderance of 
the evidence that the agent had the authority, expres,, 
or implied, to receive payment on behalf of the principal. 
This court has repeatedly followed the familiar rule 
from Goddard v. Lexington Motor Co. 63 Utah 161, 
165, 223 P. 340, that the existence or nonexistence of 
such agency is a question of fact for the jury: 
\\Then any evidence is adduced tending to 
prove the existence of a disputed agency, its ex-
istence or nonexistence is as a general rule a 
question of fact for the jury, aided by proper 
instructions from the court, even though the evi-
dence is not full and satisfactory, and in such 
cases it is error for the court to take the question 
from the jury by directing a verdict by instruction, 
by non-suit, or by sustaining a demurrer to the 
evidence. 
Justice Crockett, in his concurring opinion in H ol-
land v. Columbia Iron Afining Co. (1956) 4 Utah 2d 303, 
293 P. 2d 700, at page 311 of the Utah RepOTts, sum-
marized the approach a trial judge should take in ruling 
upon a motion for summary judgment. Likewise, Justice 
Wade, in an opinion dissenting in part in the same case, 
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at pages 316 and 317 of the Utah Reports, outlined in 
some detail the considerations which should be properly 
made before Summary Judgment is granted. 
While the facts in the instant case are much stronger 
for reversal than in the Holland case, these opinions are 
particularly controlling in this case. The trial court in 
the instant case exceeded its authority in granting judg-
ment against appellant, thereby wrongfully depriving 
her of her right to trial. Certainly when properly viewed 
in accordance with all applicable legal principles, rea-
sonable minds would make findings that would make out 
a cause of action against Belco Petroleum Corporation 
on plaintiff's claim. The evidence and all reasonable in-
ferences therefrom would much more logically support a 
Summary Judgment in favor of appellant than Belco. 
POINT III 
GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACTS 
EXIST AS TO WHETHER THERE WAS AGENCY, 
EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, OR APPARENT, SUFFI-
CIENT FOR DEFENDANT BELCO PETROLEUM 
CORPORATION TO RELY ON PAYMENT TO 
LARSEN AS AGENT OF THE DECEASED. 
It is respectfully suggested that if this court now ap-
plies the tests set forth in the opinions of Justice Wade 
and Justice Crockett in Holland v. Columbia Iron Min-
ing Company, supra, there could be no question but that 
there are genuine issues of material facts sufficient to 
warrant the submission of the case to a jury. There is a 
"genuine issue as to any material fact" unless all facts 
which affect the rights or liabilities of the parties are 
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so conclusively shmvn that there is not the slightest doubt 
thereon, and in order to sustain such a judgment, such 
facts must show that the moving party is entitled to a 
judgment as a matter of law. See opinion of Justice 
\.\lade in Holland v. Columbia Iron Mining Company, 
supra. The court, in deciding such a motion must con-
sider all evidence and inferences to be drawn therefrom 
in the light most favorable to the appellant. It is plain-
tiff's position that there is no valid legal basis upon 
which the judgment of the trial court can be sustained. 
There is absolutely no evidence of direct authority 
from Kinsley to the defendant Lewis H. Larsen to receive 
the cash for the sale of the mineral interests. It has hem 
shown that Kinsleys dealt directly with the attorney 
for Belco and personally executed all documents and as-
signments in connection with the conveyance and trans-
fer and that the attorney for Belco, while corresponding 
with the Kinsleys immediately prior to the time of the 
transfer, did not advise the Kinsleys of the fact that 
Belco had entered into an agreement with Larsen, under 
the terms of which it intended to pay Larsen, as agent, 
for Kinsleys' property, nor of the fact that it intended to 
pay Kinsley. The Kinsleys were entitled to believe that 
payment would be made directly to them by Belco in-
asmuch as they had been receiving all royalty and other 
payments direct from Belco on the property involved 
for some time prior to March, 1962. Further, the defend-
ant Larsen admitted payment by Belco to him on March 
22, 1962, (R 2, 29). Larsen, in a letter dated March 26, 
1962, indicated to Kinsley that "it appears the deal will 
be closed for the full amount of $192,000.00," after he 
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had already received the money from Belco and deposited 
the same to his account at Walker Bank & Trust Com-
pany ( R 56, 5 7 a). When considering these facts in light 
of the Goddard case, supra, and the general rule of law 
that ordinarily such an agent does not have authority to 
receive payment, there can be no question but that the 
matter should have been submitted to a jury and that 
he jury could reasonably and properly find a verdict in 
favor of the plaintiff. 
If in fact the payments of the royalties and other 
amounts due under the leases prior to March of 1962, 
had been paid to the Larsens without objection by Kins-
leys, such would have been evidence of implied authority 
to receive the purchase price. But here the contrary situa-
tion exists ( R 66) and the fact that Belco was paying 
the royalty and other payments due under the leases 
direct to the Kinsleys prior to March, 1962, is competent 
evidence that Belco did not intend, as far as Kinsley 
was concerned, to rely upon the Larsens as an agent and 
that Larsen was in fact not an agent for the purpose of 
receiving payments of any kind under the lease or of 
payment of the purchase price. 
In order to establish an inference of such authority, 
the conduct of the agent must be known to the principal 
and reasonably relied on by the third party. The record 
is absent of any showing that the Kinsleys had any 
knowledge whatsoever of any misrepresentations of Lewis 
H. Larsen to Belco as to his authority. It has been re-
peatedly held that knowledge of representations of an 
agent outside the scope of his authority, cannot be im-
puted to the principal. Under the facts at bar if anyone 
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was misled, it was the decedent Kinsley and plaintiff, 
and certainly not Belco. 
The fact that the actual documents of conveyance 
and assignments were ref erred back to Lewis H. Lanen 
in Salt Lake City is not conclusive under any circum-
stances of his authority to receive the purchase price, but 
is merely one of the facts to be weighed and considered 
by a jury in determining the scope of authority of such 
an agent. Campbell v. Gowans, ( 1909) 35 Utah 268, 
278, 280, 100 P. 397. 
Belco was under an aboslute legal duty to inquire 
into and prove the extent of authority or limitatioos 
thereon as far as Larsen was concerned. Whether Belco 
was justified in relying upon the scope of the agency or 
the apparent authority of Larsen at most, presented a 
further question for jury determination. It is respectfully 
submitted that the Summary Judgment should not have 
been granted as the evidence does not preclude all rcumi-
able possibility that appellant could establish a valid 
claim at a trial. On the contrary, under the overwhelming 
weight of authority, and without exception, the cues 
f'xamined show that jury verdicts under similar circum-
stances have been upheld on appeal. 
POINT IV 
NO FORMAL POWER OF ATIORNEY WAS 
EXECUTED OR RECORDED AND THE DEFEND-
ANT BELCO PETROLEUM CORPORATION, AS 
A 1\1ATTER OF LAW, COULD NOT RELY ON 
THE REPRESENTATIONS OF LARSEN AS TO 
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THE SCOPE OF THE AGENCY AND WAS BOUND 
TO ASCERTAIN THE LIMITATIONS THEREOF. 
There can be no question but that the overriding 
royalty and working interest in the oil and gas lease 
constitute an interest in real estate. No power of attorney 
was executed or recorded pursuant to 57-1-8, Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953. This statute requires a power of at-
torney to be acknowledged and recorded in order that 
a third party, such as Belco, may rely on the authority 
of an agent to act in any matter whereby an interest in 
real property may be affected. 
Appellant contends that Belco, in addition to being 
put on notice of the limitations of the agency as a matter 
of law, was bound by the requirements of the statute 
relating to powers of attorney before it could, with im-
punity, deal with Larsen as an agent, particularly with-
out notice to Kinsley. 
The ruling of this court in the case of Malia, State 
Bank Commissioner, et al, v. Giles, et al, 100 Utah 562, 
114 P. 2d 208, supports this proposition that as a matter 
of law Belco had no authority under the circumstances to 
make payment to Larsen as agent. 
The Malia case involved the question of the "ap-
parent authority" of an agent to pledge the principal's 
property. The court held that the extent of an agent's 
apparent authority is not measured by the extent of 
power exercised by the agent; but by the principal's 
conduct with reference to the power exercised by the 
agent, and that a course of conduct creating an apparent 
authority in an agent embraces only those matters which 
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are incident to such course of conduct. In determining 
what may or may not be included as incidents of that 
conduct, the court said that it should not overlook the 
requirements of the law as it may by statute or otherwise 
be made applicable to such conduct. 
Under the Malia case, a greater duty was placed 
upon Belco to ascertain the limitations upon Larsen's 
agency, in view of our statute which requires a power of 
attorney to be acknowledged and recorded before one 
may deal with a party as an agent whereby any real 
property is affected. This is particularly true in view of 
the fact that Belco made all payments for rentals and 
royalties from the property in question direct to the 
Kinsleys for many months, and, inasmuch as Belco and 
its attorneys corresponded with and sent all deeds, assign-
ments, etc. to the Kinsleys for signature, thereby leading 
Kinsleys to believe they would receive payment direct as 
they were accustomed to. Under such circumstances the 
court should rule, as a matter of law, that Belco could 
not rely on the representation of Larsen to any extent, 
and that the Kinsleys were entitled to believe that pay-
ment of the purchase price would be made to them. 
POINT V 
THERE IS NO EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE 
FINDING THAT OTHO V. KINSLEY EXECUTED 
AND DELIVERED TO LEWIS H. LARSEN AS-
SIGNMENTS OF ALL HIS INTEREST IN THE 
MINERAL LEASES. 
Paragraph 2 of the Summary Judgment reads as 
follows: 
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That prior to 1\farch 22, 1962, Otho V. Kins-
lev executed and delivered to Lewis H. Larsen 
a~ignments of all his interest in and to Utah 
Mineral Lease Nos. 13692 and 8366 (R 72). 
It is difficult to determine from the reading of the 
above finding made by the trial court whether the court 
was confused or misled. In any event, the finding is 
ambiguow and misleading in that it infers that Kinsley 
executed and delivered assignments of his interest in 
the leases in favor of Lewis H. Larsen. Such is absolutely 
contrary to fact as all of the assignments and documents 
of conveyance were executed in favor of Belco Petroleum 
Corporation and no claim has been made otherwise 
(R 50, 65). Even paragraph 15 of the affidavit of 
Lawrence Ruben states that the documents of transfer 
were duly executed by Otho V. Kinsley and Mrs. Kinsley 
(R 53, 54). 
Paragraph 3 of the Findings, to-wit, "that Lewis H. 
Larsen did deliver the assignment of Otho V. Kinsley 
unto the attorney for the defendant Belco Petroleum 
Corporation, and was delivered in exchange for said 
aaignment two drafts totaling $384,000.00 made payable 
to "Lewis H. Larsen, as agent." is also susceptible of 
a double meaning and ambiguous. Paragraph 3 when 
read in connection with paragraph 2 indicates that the 
court found that the assignments were executed in favor 
of Larsen who then delivered the same to Belco and 
received the checks. This is absolutely contrary to the 
facts and these is no evidence to support such findings. 
The findings assure Belco that the facts most favor· 
able to it appeared as official findings of the court, but 
L 
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ignore most other material facts, from which different in-
ferences mav be drawn. The fact that the documents of 
conveyance and assignment in favor of Belco were re-
turned to Larsen by Kinsley is not conclusive of the 
question on agency and authority but is a matter of 
evidence to be weighed and considered in connection 
with all of the facts and circumstances in evidence. See 
Campbell v. Gowans, supra. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant respectfully submits that the trial court 
erred in granting a Summary Judgment dismimng the 
plaintiff's Complaint as against Belco. The cases, almost 
without exception, hold that under the circumstances 
of the case the defendant Lewis H. Larsen could not 
have been authorized, as a matter of law, to receive the 
payment of the sales price of the property as agent and 
such payment does not constitute payment to the prin-
cipal. Under the basic and fundamental rules of agency, 
Belco was charged with the absolute duty of inquiry as 
to the scope of Larsen's purported authority and in deal-
ing with Larsen under the circumstances did so at its 
peril. The loss to the decedent and appellant never would 
have occurred had Belco properly performed this duty. 
The loss could have been avoided merely by notice to the 
decedent by Belco that it intended to pay Larsen as agent, 
or by simply making the checks payable jointly to both 
Kinsley and Larsen, the record owners of the interests, 
in accordance with normal and customary business 
methods. 
Under cases too numerous to mention, it is clear 
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that the trial court exceeded its authority in holding 
that there were no genuine issues of fact and that Belco 
was entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. The 
evidence, which was largely uncontroverted, and all 
reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom, would 
much more logically support a judgment in favor of 
appellant than Belco. At most, the questions concerning 
the scope of the agency were issues for jury determination 
and not for arbitrary and summary decision based on 
incomplete affidavits and counter-affidavits. 
The judgment of the trial court was wholly erroneous 
and should be reversed reinstating plaintiff's Complaint 
against Belco Petroleum Corporation. 
Respectfully submitted, 
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By Verl C. Ritchie 
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